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Five Questions After Atlantic Marine
Stephen E. Sachs*
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Atlantic Marine did a lot to clear up the law of forum
selection. But it also left a number of live questions in place. This Article briefly
discusses five of them. When a party wants to move a case to the selected forum, what
procedures can it use, other than venue transfer or forum non conveniens? When is a
forum-selection clause valid and enforceable, as a matter of state or federal law? If the
clause isn’t valid, should a federal court still give it any weight? What happens if there
are multiple parties or claims, and the clause applies to some but not others? And what
do the Court’s new standards mean for parties appealing a forum-selection ruling,
either before or after a final judgment? Judges are already wrestling with these
questions, but the answers aren’t easy—and may well require another trip to the
Supreme Court.

* Associate Professor, Duke University School of Law. For advice and comments, I am grateful
to William Baude, Kevin Clermont, and Amanda Schwoerke, and to all of the participants in this
Symposium. I am also grateful to Ethan Mann for excellent research assistance.
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Introduction
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Atlantic Marine Construction Co. v.
U.S. District Court did a lot to clear up the law of forum selection.1 As
the Court explained, a private forum-selection agreement isn’t a venue
defect; when Congress has said that venue is proper, the parties can’t
make it improper by contract.2 Instead, to move their case to the chosen
court, the parties can seek transfer to another federal forum, such as
under 28 U.S.C. § 1404;3 to get to a state or foreign court, they can try
forum non conveniens.4 If they do, and if their agreements are valid, then
their motions will probably be granted, unless there are exceptional
public interests pointing the other way.5 And once the parties have
landed in the new forum, they can litigate under the choice-of-law rules
of the court they chose.6
At the same time, Atlantic Marine declined to address some
significant issues facing the district courts. This Article briefly discusses
five areas where the Court left live questions in place:
(1) What other remedies are out there? The Court approved of
venue transfer and forum non conveniens, but are there other ways
that parties can have their clauses enforced? In particular, can a
defendant get a misfiled action dismissed—and if so, how?
(2) When is a forum-selection clause valid? Is forum selection an
issue of state law or federal law? If it’s state law, then which state? And
if it’s federal law, where does it come from?

1. 134 S. Ct. 568 (2013).
2. Id. at 575, 577 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (2006); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3)).
3. Id. at 579 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2006) (permitting venue transfer to another district “[f]or
the convenience of parties and witnesses” and “in the interest of justice”)). Unless otherwise indicated,
subsequent references in the text to U.S. Code sections are to Title 28, and subsequent references to
“Rules” are to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
4. Id. at 580; cf. Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malay. Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 425 (2007)
(noting that courts may dismiss for forum non conveniens when a “more appropriate and convenient
forum” exists elsewhere).
5. Id. at 581–82.
6. Id. at 582–83 (distinguishing Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516 (1990); Van Dusen v.
Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964)).
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(3) What if the clause isn’t valid? If a court finds a clause invalid,
under whatever law might apply, what force does the clause have then?
Should the court disregard it entirely, or does it still weigh in the
balance somehow?
(4) What about multiple parties or claims? If the clause applies
to only some parties or claims but not others, how should the court
review a transfer motion? When should it sever certain claims for
transfer, and when should it keep the litigation whole?
(5) What happens on appeal? If a court erroneously denies a
transfer, do the heightened standards make it easier to get mandamus?
Or does the prospect of new substantive law in the new forum mean
that any error can be adequately remedied on appeal?

Many of these questions are hard ones; this Article doesn’t suggest all
the answers. But judges will need answers, and soon. And if they don’t
find them, then the problem of forum selection may be headed back to
the Supreme Court.

I. What Other Remedies Are Out There?
Atlantic Marine established, once and for all, that forum selection

doesn’t destroy proper venue.7 That largely eliminated one family of
remedies for enforcing parties’ agreements, namely dismissal under Rule
12(b)(3)8 or transfer to the selected forum under § 1406.9 The Court
specifically approved two other means of enforcement: § 1404 transfer to
another federal district, or forum non conveniens dismissal in favor of a
state or foreign court. But it didn’t describe those remedies as exclusive.
In particular, the Court left in place an existing circuit split on
whether courts can dismiss misfiled cases under Rule 12(b)(6)10—or,
more generally, whether violating a forum-selection agreement serves as
an affirmative defense, which the defendant can plead in the answer and
raise on a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c), on
summary judgment under Rule 56, or at trial.11 Because the parties in

7. Id. at 575, 577.
8. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3) (permitting dismissal on motion for “improper venue”).
9. 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (2012) (permitting dismissal or transfer when a case is filed “laying venue
in the wrong division or district”).
10. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (permitting dismissal on motion for “failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted”). Compare, e.g., Smith v. Aegon Cos. Pension Plan, 769 F.3d 922, 933–34
(6th Cir. 2014) (holding that 12(b)(6) may be used to enforce a forum-selection agreement); Rivera v.
Centro Médico de Turabo, Inc., 575 F.3d 10, 15 (1st Cir. 2009) (same), and Salovaara v. Jackson Nat.
Life Ins. Co., 246 F.3d 289, 298–99 (3d Cir. 2001) (same), with Sucampo Pharms., Inc. v. Astellas
Pharma, Inc., 471 F.3d 544, 549 (4th Cir. 2006) (holding that it shouldn’t), and Argueta v. Banco
Mexicano, S.A., 87 F.3d 320, 324 (9th Cir. 1996) (same).
11. See generally Brief of Professor Stephen E. Sachs as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither
Party, Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. 568 (No. 12-929), http://ssrn.com/id=2284517 [hereinafter “Sachs Brief”].
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Atlantic Marine hadn’t raised or briefed the issue, the Court chose not to
discuss it either.12
This Article doesn’t take a position on that split (though I have
before, and do again in forthcoming work).13 For present purposes,
though, it’s worth highlighting some of the uncertainties that resulted
from the Court’s leaving the question unsettled.
The most obvious uncertainty is that different remedies are
available in different places. For a plaintiff willing to test the clause, filing
suit in the First, Third, or Sixth Circuits, say,14 runs the risk that the case
will be dismissed and not just transferred. That not only involves the
repeat expenses of refiling (added fees, extra motions practice, and so
on), but a real risk of losing the case altogether if the limitations period
lapses in the interim.15 All else being equal, a plaintiff shopping for a
federal forum will have strong reasons to pick a circuit where § 1404 is
the only remedy. And any plaintiff that does lose on a 12(b)(6) motion,
especially a plaintiff now barred by the statute of limitations, can
plausibly argue that the case would have come out differently in other
circuits—meaning that this clear and recognized circuit split may soon be
headed back to the Court.
A second uncertainty arises in circuits where 12(b)(6) dismissals are
already available. How do these various types of relief work together? If
the chosen forum is a state or foreign court, then there’s no big problem:
once the case is dismissed, the plaintiff won’t really care whether the
reason was 12(b)(6) or forum non conveniens, so long as it has an equal
chance to refile.16 But when the chosen forum is federal, and the
alternative is a § 1404 transfer, sophisticated defendants will often ask for
that alternative, just in case their motion to dismiss is denied. As Atlantic
Marine pointed out, a § 1404 transfer has certain procedural advantages
for defendants: for one thing, the court, and not the jury, will decide any
genuinely disputed facts.17 And the court can always grant a § 1404
transfer sua sponte, without any party having asked for one.18

12. Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 580 & n.4.
13. See generally Sachs Brief, supra note 11; Stephen E. Sachs, The Forum Selection Defense,
10 Duke J. Const. L. & Pub. Pol’y (forthcoming 2015).
14. See Smith, 769 F.3d at 933–34 (holding that 12(b)(6) may be used to enforce a forum-selection
agreement); Rivera, 575 F.3d at 15 (same); Salovaara, 246 F.3d at 298–99.
15. See Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 583 n.8.
16. Some courts distinguish between the two, dismissing for forum non conveniens only when
refiling is actually possible—for instance, by conditioning the dismissal on a waiver of limitations
defenses. See, e.g., Compania Naviera Joanna SA v. Koninklijke Boskalis Westminster NV, 569 F.3d
189, 205 (4th Cir. 2009). But Atlantic Marine suggested that those conditions are unnecessary or even
unfair, at least in the forum-selection context. 134 S. Ct. at 583 n.8.
17. Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 580 n.4. Compare Fed. R. Civ. P. 43(c) (“When a motion relies on
facts outside the record, the court may hear the matter on affidavits or may hear it wholly or partly on
oral testimony or on depositions.”), with Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d) (“If, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6)
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That raises the question of whether there’s any “order of battle”
here, as used to apply in the Court’s qualified immunity cases.19 Does a
court facing alternative motions—one to dismiss and one to transfer—
have to decide one before the other? If the defendant asks only for
dismissal, can the court jump the gun with a sua sponte transfer? And if
the court does transfer the case, will that moot any pending motion to
dismiss, or will the defendant be entitled to any additional remedy for
having been forced to litigate in the wrong forum?
Thus far, district courts facing these questions have gone different
ways. Long before Atlantic Marine, the Third Circuit had described the
choice between dismissal and transfer as a matter of discretion,20 and
some district courts still treat it that way.21 Other courts, though, have
read Atlantic Marine as sufficiently “emphatic” in favor of § 1404 as to
transform 12(b)(6) motions into transfer motions instead.22
One way to handle this choice would be to follow the procedure for
venue dismissals. When a case is filed “laying venue in the wrong division
or district,” § 1406 requires a court to “dismiss, or if it be in the interest
of justice, transfer such case to any district or division in which it could
have been brought.”23 By its terms, § 1406 doesn’t apply to forum
selection; a private agreement can’t make a right venue into a “wrong”
venue, as Atlantic Marine made clear.24 But the statute puts a similar
choice before the courts, as Congress specifically retained the option of
dismissal should a transfer prove unjust.25 Most of the time, courts are
expected to transfer cases under § 1406, to avoid additional costs or

or 12(c), matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion
must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56.”).
18. See 15 Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 3844 n.2 (4th ed.
2013). Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2012) (“For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest
of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have
been brought or to any district or division to which all parties have consented.”), with 28 U.S.C. § 1404(b)
(permitting transfers among divisions only “[u]pon motion, consent or stipulation of all parties”).
19. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 235 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).
20. See Salovaara v. Jackson Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 246 F.3d 289, 299 (3d Cir. 2001).
21. See, e.g., Fares v. Lankau, No. CV 12-1381, 2014 WL 2754728, at *3 (D. Del. June 17, 2014);
see also Carter’s of New Bedford, Inc. v. Nike, Inc., No. 13-11513, 2014 WL 1311750, at *2 n.5 (D.
Mass. Mar. 31, 2014).
22. See Caribbean Restaurants, LLC v. Burger King Corp., No. 14-1200 (PG), 2014 WL 2465133,
at *4 (D.P.R. June 3, 2014); see also KNL Constr., Inc. v. Killian Constr. Co., No. 3:14-cv-412-un2,
2014 WL 1671959, at *1 n.2, *3 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 28, 2014), reconsideration denied, 2014 WL 4185769 (M.D.
Pa. Aug. 21, 2014) (construing a “motion to dismiss . . . as a motion to transfer” based on the “thrust”
of Atlantic Marine).
23. 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a).
24. Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 134 S. Ct. 568, 577 (2013).
25. See Act of May 24, 1949, ch. 139, § 81, 63 Stat. 89, 101 (reinserting the option of dismissal into
§ 1406(a)).
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limitations problems.26 Yet they retain discretion to dismiss as an
informal sanction, such as when the misfiling appears deliberate.27
In theory, courts could do the same thing in forum-selection cases,
transferring the action under normal circumstances (whether on motion
or sua sponte) and dismissing when the plaintiff is truly in the wrong. For
the moment, though, that approach is only possible in certain circuits; in
others, transfer is the only remedy, no matter how deliberate or improper
the plaintiff’s choice of forum.

II. When Is a Forum-Selection Clause Valid?
Atlantic Marine places enormous weight on whether a forumselection clause is valid and enforceable. If it is, enforcement is virtually
automatic; “[o]nly under extraordinary circumstances” will a plaintiff be
allowed to litigate somewhere other than the chosen forum.28 Yet the
opinion says nothing about which clauses are valid in the first place. The
Court assumed, without deciding, that the clause before it was enforceable;
its analysis simply “presuppose[d] a contractually valid forum-selection
clause.”29 That left open a recognized circuit split on whether forum
selection in federal courts, when they hear cases involving state-law
claims, should be governed by federal law or by state law under Erie
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins.30 Although some courts and scholars have
taken strong positions on this issue,31 the question is a legitimately
difficult one, and there are good arguments to be made on both sides.
So far, the Court has decided plenty of forum-selection cases
without identifying any governing law. The first modern cases arose in
admiralty, and the Court claimed to be applying only admiralty
doctrines.32 When it encountered its first land-based dispute, the Court
avoided the Erie issue; it refused to decide “whether the forum selection
clause in this case [was] unenforceable under the [admiralty] standards,”33

26. See Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 463, 467 (1962) (encouraging transfer to avoid “timeconsuming and justice-defeating technicalities” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
27. See 14d Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 3827 (4th ed. 2013)
(noting a pattern of dismissal “if the plaintiff’s attorney reasonably could have foreseen that the forum
in which the suit was filed was improper and that similar conduct should be discouraged”).
28. Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 581.
29. Id. at 581 n.5.
30. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
31. See infra notes 40–50 and accompanying text.
32. See, e.g., Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 590 (1991) (“[T]his is a case in
admiralty, and federal law governs the enforceability of the forum-selection clause we scrutinize.”);
The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 10 (1972) (“We believe this is the correct doctrine to
be followed by federal district courts sitting in admiralty.”).
33. Stewart Org. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 29 (1988) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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instead treating the clause merely as one fact in an all-things-considered
§ 1404 analysis.34
The Court again ducked the question in Atlantic Marine, this time
at the instance of the parties. Although the plaintiff-respondent had
challenged the clause’s validity in the district court, it dropped the challenge
on appeal and at the certiorari stage.35 At that point, the issue was
waived,36 allowing the Court to “presuppose[]” validity.37
In other cases, though, things won’t be so easy. Parties resisting a
forum-selection clause regularly contest whether the clause is valid.
Sometimes they rely on specific state statutes—for example, statutes
restricting forum selection in construction contracts, like the one at issue
in Atlantic Marine.38 Or they cite general standards drawn from the
federal admiralty cases, claiming that the clause is “unfair, unjust, or
unreasonable” because of “fraud, undue influence, or overweening
bargaining power.”39 When the parties’ claims are based on federal law,
there’s a strong argument that federal law should control where those
claims can be heard. But when the claims arise from state law only, the
circuits have long disagreed on which standards apply,40 a split that has
persisted in published opinions even after Atlantic Marine.41 Because the
choice of law can make or break a forum-selection clause, this dispute is
going to be headed back to the Court. What will happen when it gets there?
On the one hand, the argument for state law is easy to make, and it
has substantial academic opinion behind it.42 Forum-selection clauses are
part of contracts, and contract law is state law. If a claim arises under
Texas law, and Texas won’t let construction firms waive the right to sue
at home,43 then how can the federal courts do so? The choice of state or
federal standards can have all-or-nothing consequences for forum
34. Id. at 29–32. According to a parenthetical dictum in Ferens v. John Deere Co., Stewart endorsed
the federal-law view, see 494 U.S. 516, 526 (1990), but that parenthetical rests on a misreading. See
Sachs Brief, supra note 11, at 29 n.15; see also infra text accompanying notes 55–63.
35. See Sachs Brief, supra note 11, at 31.
36. Sup. Ct. R. 15.2.
37. Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 134 S. Ct. 568, 581 n.5 (2013).
38. E.g., Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. § 272.001(b) (West 2014); cf. United States ex rel. J-Crew
Mgmt., Inc. v. Atl. Marine Constr. Co., No. A-12-CV-228-LY, 2012 WL 8499879, at *3 (W.D. Tex.
Aug. 6, 2012) (holding the Texas statute inapplicable because the particular contract at issue involved
the federal enclave at Fort Hood).
39. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 12, 18 (1972).
40. Compare Albemarle Corp. v. AstraZeneca UK Ltd., 628 F.3d 643, 650 (4th Cir. 2010) (federal
law), with IFC Credit Corp. v. United Bus. & Indus. Fed. Credit Union, 512 F.3d 989, 991 (7th Cir.
2008) (state law).
41. Compare Martinez v. Bloomberg LP, 740 F.3d 211, 217 (2d Cir. 2014) (federal law), with
Jackson v. Payday Fin., LLC, 764 F.3d 765, 774 (7th Cir. 2014) (state law).
42. See, e.g., Linda S. Mullenix, Gaming the System: Protecting Consumers from Unconscionable
Contractual Forum-Selection and Arbitration Clauses, 66 Hastings L.J. 719 2015); Adam N.
Steinman, Atlantic Marine Through the Lens of Erie, 66 Hastings L.J. 795 (2015).
43. See Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. § 272.001(b).
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selection—including, under the Court’s new approach, changing the
substantive law that’s applied in the new forum.44 So using a different
standard in federal courts, as compared to state courts, will create strong
incentives for forum shopping.45 And if the point of Erie is to avoid
advantaging certain parties through the “accident of diversity
jurisdiction,”46 then surely state law should apply. (Though which state’s
law is another hard question—especially when the applicable state
choice-of-law rule is unclear, or when the contract itself includes a
choice-of-law clause.47)
On the other hand, most courts have held that federal law governs
the parties’ choice of a federal forum, regardless of what law gives rise to
the suit.48 They reason, “[q]uestions of venue and the enforcement of
forum selection clauses are essentially procedural, rather than substantive,
in nature.”49 Even if the state courts would hear a given case, that doesn’t
necessarily control how the federal courts should manage their dockets.
So, they conclude, forum selection in federal courts may well be a subject
for “federal common law”—which, under the standards of The Bremen
and its progeny, “directs courts to favor enforcement of the agreement,
so long as it is not unreasonable.”50
At the moment, it’s hard to say which side is right. Without any
federal statute or authorized rule on the subject, we have to “wade into
Erie’s murky waters”51—deciding whether a state standard would serve
“the twin aims of the Erie rule,” namely “discouragement of forumshopping and avoidance of inequitable administration of the laws,”52 or
whether we need a federal standard to preserve an “essential
characteristic of [the federal] system.”53 That’s not an easy question to
answer. I have some opinions myself, which I discuss at greater length
elsewhere.54 But as Erie issues go, the questions posed by forum
selection are even murkier than usual.

44.
45.
46.
47.

Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 134 S. Ct. 568, 582–83 (2013).

See Mullenix, supra note 42, at 736–41.
Mims v. Arrow Fin. Servs., LLC, 132 S. Ct. 740, 751 (2012).

See Linda S. Mullenix, Another Choice of Forum, Another Choice of Law: Consensual
Adjudicatory Procedure in Federal Court, 57 Fordham L. Rev. 291, 332–39 (1988).
48. See Wong v. PartyGaming Ltd., 589 F.3d 821, 827 (6th Cir. 2009) (describing cases from six
circuits to this effect).
49. Jones v. Weibrecht, 901 F.2d 17, 19 (2d Cir. 1990); accord Martinez v. Bloomberg LP, 740
F.3d 211, 220 (2d Cir. 2014).
50. Albemarle Corp. v. AstraZeneca UK Ltd., 628 F.3d 643, 649 (4th Cir. 2010).
51. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 398 (2010).
52. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965).
53. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 537 (1958).
54. See generally Sachs, supra note 13.
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III. What if the Clause Isn’t Valid?
The Court’s assumption of validity in Atlantic Marine did more than
just avoid an Erie problem. It also let the Court pass over a very real
tension between its new rules, which treat validity as crucial, and its prior
decision in Stewart Organization v. Ricoh Corp, which treated validity as
a nonissue.55 The Court’s partial overruling of Stewart leaves substantial
doubt about what should happen when a clause isn’t valid, under whatever
source of law might control, and yet the defendant seeks to enforce it
anyway.
In Stewart, the defendant tried to enforce a forum-selection clause
through a venue transfer motion under § 1404.56 As noted above, the
Court deliberately declined to say “whether the forum selection clause in
this case [was] unenforceable under the [admiralty] standards.”57 Indeed,
it viewed that question as irrelevant. Rather than giving the clause any
independent legal effect—which would be inappropriate, of course, without
first finding it valid—the Court treated the clause merely as fodder in a
standard § 1404 analysis, purportedly using the same factors as are
always applied under that statute.58
To determine “the convenience of [another] forum” for § 1404
purposes, Stewart reasoned, we’d of course want to know “the parties’
expressed preference for that venue,” as well as “the fairness of transfer
in light of the forum-selection clause and the parties’ relative bargaining
power.”59 In other words, according to Stewart, § 1404 achieves something
like the admiralty standards in miniature. A clause can justify transfer
even if it’s wholly unenforceable under the relevant law (for missing
certain formalities,60 involving a certain subject area,61 and so on),
because “the parties’ private expression of their venue preferences”—
again, taking “relative bargaining power” into account—is a “significant
factor”62 in determining “the interest of justice.”63 Its mere presence in
an agreement signed by both parties can change the analysis, regardless
of whether that agreement also carries the force of law.
Stewart’s approach has a certain amount of sense to it. Suppose that
state law governed enforcement, and that the relevant state required
forum-selection agreements to be in writing. If we had video of the
parties swearing to each other only to sue in a particular federal court,

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

487 U.S. 22 (1988).

Id. at 24.
Id. at 29 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 29–32.
Id. at 29.
Cf. Sachs Brief, supra note 11, at 30 n.15 (suggesting “the signatures of seven witnesses in red ink”).
E.g., Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. § 272.001 (West 2014) (construction).
Stewart, 487 U.S. at 29–30.
28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2012).
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that might not create any binding obligations, but it might still affect our
sense of “the convenience of [the] parties” and “the interest of justice.”64
Or suppose that all of the plaintiff’s other contracts choose a forum in
Virginia, just not this one. That wouldn’t let courts impose the same
choice here, but it still tells us something about the relative merits of a
Virginia forum, and it might lead us to disbelieve the plaintiff’s later
protestations of inconvenience. In § 1404’s all-things-considered analysis,
these facts will carry some weight, regardless of whether they also carry
the force of state contract law. Maybe the Court in Stewart wasn’t really
relying on § 1404 in this way; maybe it was letting a presumption of legal
enforceability sneak in the back door.65 But Stewart claimed, at the very
least, to be doing nothing over and above ordinary transfer analysis.
By contrast, the Court in Atlantic Marine is very consciously doing
something new. And the linchpin of its new test is validity. Only “a valid
forum-selection clause requires district courts to adjust their usual
§ 1404(a) analysis”—to disregard “the plaintiff’s choice of forum,” to
ignore “arguments about the parties’ private interests,” and to discard
“the original venue’s choice-of-law rules.”66 In resting so much weight on
validity, the Court didn’t base its reasoning on the majority opinion in
Stewart, but on Justice Kennedy’s two-Justice concurrence—which had
emphasized the importance of “a valid forum-selection clause.”67 But
that brief concurrence never said why validity should make a difference.
After all, from the perspective of “the convenience of parties and
witnesses” and “the interest of justice,”68 a clause that’s invalid due to
some contractual formality could carry just as much weight as one that’s
legally binding.
Maybe there are some reasons why validity should matter. On the
approach of the First, Third, and Sixth Circuits, for example, only a valid
clause should serve as an affirmative defense; if the clause isn’t legally
obligatory on the parties, then it shouldn’t act as a legal barrier to suit.
Perhaps validity also ought to matter for choice of law; maybe only those
parties with a binding obligation not to sue in a particular forum have
really “waived their right” to “the law of the transferor venue.”69 But
when it comes to the standards for granting or denying transfers, § 1404
isn’t about legal constraints; it’s about convenience and justice, and it can
be upset for public-interest reasons having nothing to do with the parties’

64. Id.
65. See Stewart, 487 U.S. at 34–35 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority had
supplemented § 1404’s forward-looking considerations with a separate, backward-looking consideration
of the forum-selection clause).
66. Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 134 S. Ct. 568, 581–82 (2013) (emphasis added).
67. See id. at 581 (quoting Stewart, 487 U.S. at 33 (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
68. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).
69. See Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 583.
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obligations.70 It’s hard to say why, for example, a court should have to
resolve the difficult Erie questions above before resolving whether the
interest of justice supports litigation in another forum.
This emphasis on validity also leaves courts in the dark about what
to do once they conclude that a clause isn’t valid—or, more likely, when
they’re not sure and would rather not have to decide. Ordinary § 1404
transfer is always available, even without the supercharged Atlantic
Marine standards; if a case qualifies for ordinary § 1404 transfer anyway,
maybe that can save courts the trouble. But what is “ordinary” § 1404
transfer in the forum-selection context, after Atlantic Marine? Do the
somewhat heightened standards of Stewart survive, or do the new rules
and their requirement of validity now occupy the field, rendering all
other clauses wholly null and void?
And if we figure that out, it still won’t save the courts any work,
because the choice of law in the transferee forum now depends on which
kind of § 1404 transfer the parties got, which in turn depends on whether
the clause is valid. This is a problem to which the Court may not have
adverted, because the choice-of-law issue wasn’t actually briefed. While a
number of parties and amici noted that regular § 1404 leaves choice of
law alone,71 no one breathed a word about revising that standard before
Justice Ginsburg raised the possibility at oral argument.72 So while these
revisions to choice of law may be welcome,73 they raise a number of
thorny problems for the future.

IV. What About Multiple Parties or Claims?
Forum selection isn’t always all or nothing. A single lawsuit can
combine multiple claims against multiple parties; some of those might be
committed to a particular forum, while others might not. And depending
on the rules for validity, a single clause might be valid as to some claims
or parties but invalid as to others. Atlantic Marine creates problems for
these cases, because the remedy that the Court announced has a broader
scope than the right it’s supposed to enforce. Whether a clause applies
and is valid, and thus triggers the Court’s heightened standards for § 1404
70. See id. at 581 & n.6, 582.
71. See, e.g., Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 20–21, Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. 568 (No. 12-929)
(citing Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516, 522–23 (1990)); Brief for the Petitioner at 20, Atl.
Marine, 134 S. Ct. 568 (No. 12-929); Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of
America as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 16–17, Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. 568 (No. 12-929);
Sachs Brief, supra note 11, at 34 n.19.
72. Transcript of Oral Argument at 25–26, Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. 568 (No. 12-929) (“That would
be taken care of simply by saying Van Dusen v. Barrack does not apply when a party is acting in
violation of a contractual provision.”); id. at 42–43.
73. See Will Baude, Professor Stephen Sachs and Atlantic Marine v. U.S. District Court, Volokh
Conspiracy (Oct. 11, 2013, 2:07 AM), http://www.volokh.com/2013/10/11/professor-stephen-sachs-atlanticmarine-v-u-s-district-court.
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transfer, has to be determined claim by claim; but the remedy of § 1404
transfer itself can only be performed as to the action as a whole.74
District courts are starting to wrestle with this problem, but not with
much luck.75
There are two ways to handle this potential gap between rights and
remedies. One is to have a remedy that operates only on individual
claims. Affirmative defenses, for example, obviously apply on a claim-byclaim basis; if you don’t have a valid forum-selection clause as to a
particular claim, then you don’t have a forum-selection defense. Venue
dismissals can also be tailored to particular causes of action; perhaps “a
substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to” Count I
occurred in a certain district, but Count II arose from facts occurring
elsewhere.76 The same is true of forum non conveniens dismissals. Under
the liberal joinder regime of the Federal Rules,77 the plaintiff might join
a largely domestic claim with a wholly foreign one—involving foreign
facts, witnesses, evidence, and law78—and a court could, in theory,
dismiss the latter while retaining the former.
Another way to avoid the problem is to assess forum-selection
clauses on standards that only apply to the action as a whole. Under
Stewart, for example, courts could consider § 1404 motions holistically,
without worrying about the precise scope of any individual forumselection clause. If some parties in a case, but not others, had signed on
to the clause—or if, by its terms, the clause applied only to certain
claims—then the court could simply throw those facts in the pot with
everything else, and come up with an all-things-considered judgment
about the justice and convenience of transfer for everyone.
Atlantic Marine took neither of those routes. Its central remedy of
§ 1404 transfer applies only to the action as a whole. But its enforcement
standards depend crucially on the assumption that a valid forumselection clause will cover each individual claim.79 Without that
assumption, there may be a presumption for transfer as to some parties
or claims,80 but a presumption against transfer as to others.81 In fact,
because § 1404 only permits transfers to districts where the case “might
have been brought” or “to which all parties have consented,”82 sometimes
74. See 15 Wright et al., supra note 18, § 3846 & n.20.
75. See cases cited infra notes 83–86.
76. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2) (2012).
77. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 18.
78. Cf. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 241 n.6 (1981) (describing relevant factors).
79. See Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 134 S. Ct. 568, 581 (2013).
80. Id. (shifting the burden to a plaintiff resisting the clause).
81. See Piper, 454 U.S. at 255 (“[T]here is ordinarily a strong presumption in favor of the
plaintiff’s choice of forum, which may be overcome only when the private and public interest factors
clearly point towards trial in the alternative forum.”).
82. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).
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the action as a whole simply can’t be transferred to the forum that some
of the parties have selected. Courts trying to decide a single § 1404
motion, then, will have their work cut out for them.
To simplify this process, some courts have considered severing the
claims to create separate actions.83 Under Rule 21, district courts have
broad discretion to sever claims and to add or drop parties.84 Once a case
has been divided into distinct actions, one or more of those actions can
be transferred while the others are retained. But severing also carries
costs; the reason why we have a liberal joinder regime is to enable courts
to decide claims among the same parties, or “arising out of the same
transaction [or] occurrence,” at the same time.85 A number of district
courts, finding transfer inappropriate for the action as a whole, have used
their discretion to refuse to sever cases if the parties “would be forced to
proceed piecemeal” in separate courts.86
Ultimately, these are questions of discretion, which might get solved
on a case-by-case basis or generate broader rules in the courts of appeals.
But they’re questions that courts will have to face under Atlantic Marine,
and that might have been avoided under some other regime.

V. What Happens on Appeal?
Finally, Atlantic Marine creates new questions for appellate review.
What happens when a party moves for § 1404 transfer (or for forum non
conveniens dismissal) and the district court erroneously says no?
Ordinarily, these denials are hard to challenge—except on mandamus,
when Atlantic Marine’s heightened standards may help a defendant get
relief. But the changes that the Court imposed, especially to choice of
law, could create new opportunities for relief on appeal after final
judgment. And these opportunities, in turn, might actually backfire on
parties seeking early review.
Most of the time, if a district court denies a motion under § 1404 or
forum non conveniens, the movant can’t easily appeal. The denial itself

83. See, e.g., 1-Stop Fin. Serv. Ctrs. of Am., LLC v. Astonish Results, LLC, No. A-13-CA-961-SS,
2014 WL 279669, at *10 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 23, 2014); accord Carmouche Ins., Inc. v. Astonish Results, LLC,
No. 14-00061-SDD-SCR, 2014 WL 2740464, at *7 (M.D. La. June 17, 2014); Valspar Corp. v. E.I. DuPont
de Nemours & Co., No. 13-3214, 2014 WL 1607584, at *2–4 (D. Minn. Apr. 21, 2014); Excentus Corp. v.
Giant Eagle, Inc., No. 13-178, 2014 WL 923520, at *10 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 10, 2014).
84. Fed. R. Civ. P. 21 (“On motion or on its own, the court may at any time, on just terms, add or
drop a party. The court may also sever any claim against a party.”).
85. Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2)(A).
86. Jes Solar Co. v. Matinee Energy, Inc., No. cv 12-626, 2014 WL 2885476, at *2 (D. Ariz. June 25,
2014); see also, e.g., id. at *2–3; In re TFT-LCD (Flat Panel) Antitrust Litig. (Acer Am. Corp. v. Hitachi,
Ltd.), No. 13-CV-3349, 2014 WL 1477748, at *1–2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 14, 2014); Phi, Inc. v. Apical Indus.,
Inc., No. 6:13-CV-00015, 2014 WL 1820717, at *2, *4–5, *10 (W.D. La. Mar. 7, 2014), adopted, 2014 WL
1820859 (W.D. La. May 7, 2014); cf. Aquila v. Fleetwood, R.V., Inc., No. 12-CV-3281, 2014 WL 1379648,
at *4–5 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2014) (applying a similar analysis to forum non conveniens).
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isn’t an appealable “final decision[],” since the case keeps on going in the
original forum;87 nor is it reviewable as a collateral order.88 The district
court might certify the question for discretionary appeal, but then again,
it might not; many circuits find certification improper for discretionary
issues as opposed to “controlling question[s] of law.”89 So the defendant
may have to proceed with the suit wherever the plaintiff has filed. If the
case really should have been dismissed, and if the defendant eventually
loses on the merits, then this adverse final judgment can be reversed on
appeal.90 But if all the defendant wanted was a transfer, then not even
final judgment will help; the harmless error rule demands proof that the
case would have come out differently in a different forum, which is
extremely hard to come by.91
Contesting a wrongful grant of transfer is even harder. While a
forum non conveniens dismissal ends the case and enables appeal in the
ordinary course, a § 1404 transfer keeps the litigation going, albeit in
another forum. If a case is transferred into a new circuit, the new court of
appeals can’t review an order from a district court outside its territorial
jurisdiction; the complaining party’s usual remedy is to request another
transfer back to the original court, and then to seek review if that request
is denied.92
As a result, many circuits fall back on the safety valve of
mandamus—as the Fifth Circuit did in Atlantic Marine.93 Among other
things, mandamus requires a “clear and indisputable” right to relief,94
and after Atlantic Marine, that’s far easier to achieve. By shifting the

87. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2012) (providing appellate jurisdiction over “appeals from all final decisions
of the district courts of the United States”); see Ray Haluch Gravel Co. v. Cent. Pension Fund, 134
S. Ct. 773, 779 (2014) (“In the ordinary course a ‘final decision’ is one that ends the litigation on the
merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.”); accord 15 Wright et al.,
supra note 18, § 3855 & n.1.
88. See Buesgens v. Freeland, 267 F. App’x 211, 212 (4th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (“It is wellsettled that transfers under [§ 1404] are not appealable final orders.”); 15 Wright et al., supra note 18,
§ 3855 & n.22 (same); cf. Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S. 517, 527–30 (1988) (same rule for
forum non conveniens). See generally Lauro Lines s.r.l. v. Chasser, 490 U.S. 495 (1989) (denying
collateral-order review of a refusal to dismiss based on a forum-selection clause).
89. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b); see 15 Wright et al., supra note 18, § 3855 & n.26 (collecting cases).
90. See Lauro Lines, 490 U.S. at 501 (finding “an entitlement to be sued only in a particular
forum” to be “adequately vindicable” on “appeal after final judgment”).
91. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 61; In re Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 545 F.3d 304, 318–19 (5th Cir. 2008) (en banc)
(noting that appeal after final judgment is not “‘an adequate remedy’” for transfer denial, as it requires the
appellant “‘to show that it would have won the case had it been tried in a convenient [venue]’” (alteration in
original) (quoting In re Nat’l Presto Indus., Inc., 347 F.3d 662, 663 (7th Cir. 2003))).
92. See Posnanski v. Gibney, 421 F.3d 977, 980–81 (9th Cir. 2005) (collecting cases); accord
15 Wright et al., supra note 18, § 3855 & nn.8–9.
93. See In re Atl. Marine Constr. Co., 701 F.3d 736, 738 (5th Cir. 2012); accord Volkswagen,
545 F.3d at 309 (“[M]andamus is an appropriate means of testing a district court’s § 1404(a) ruling.”);
accord 15 Wright et al., supra note 18, § 3855.
94. Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367, 394 (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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burden to the party resisting the forum-selection clause, and by requiring
a showing of “extraordinary circumstances,”95 the Court ensured that
many more defendants will be able to claim “clear and indisputable”
rights to have their forum-selection clauses enforced. Or if the plaintiff
actually sues in the chosen forum and the defendant wants to litigate
somewhere else,96 it’ll be easier to resist a wrongful grant.
Yet Atlantic Marine may also make mandamus harder to get.
Another requirement of mandamus is that the party “have no other
adequate means to attain the relief he desires.”97 Atlantic Marine
changes that calculus through its new rules for choice of law. Under the
Court’s previous cases, a § 1404 transfer—whether sought by the plaintiff
or the defendant—was merely a “change of courtrooms,” with no impact
on the law to be applied.98 Atlantic Marine partially overruled these
cases, holding that when a case is transferred to the contractually chosen
forum, that forum’s choice-of-law principles should apply.99 Sometimes
that change makes all the difference in the world. For instance, in Ferens
v. John Deere Co., the new forum’s choice-of-law principles would have
barred the plaintiff’s suit entirely, applying a different statute of
limitations.100
The Court’s new rule is good for defendants generally, but it mixes
up their strategy for appeal. When choice of law makes a difference, the
wrongful denial of a transfer will no longer be harmless error after final
judgment. If the plaintiff chooses to sue in the wrong place and the
district court erroneously denies a transfer, the defendant really has been
injured; had the court done its job, the defendant might say, it would
have sent the case to the chosen forum, where the law would have barred
the plaintiff’s claim. As a result, any adverse final judgment can be
directly attributed to the district court’s mistake, and so reversed on
appeal.
That makes defendants’ lives easier in one respect, but much harder
in another. If review after final judgment is available, then review on
mandamus presumably is not. As the Court noted with respect to
collateral orders, the defendant’s claim “that it may be sued only in [a
particular forum], while not perfectly secured by appeal after final
judgment, is adequately vindicable at that stage,” just like “a claim that
the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant.”101 As a

95. Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 134 S. Ct. 568, 581 (2013).
96. See, e.g., GDG Acquisitions, LLC v. Gov’t of Belize, 749 F.3d 1024, 1027 (11th Cir. 2014).
97. Cheney, 542 U.S. at 380 (internal quotation marks omitted).
98. Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 637 (1964) (defendant); accord Ferens v. John Deere
Co., 494 U.S. 516, 523 (1990) (plaintiff).
99. 134 S. Ct. at 582–83.
100. 494 U.S. at 520–21, 526–27.
101. Lauro Lines s.r.l. v. Chasser, 490 U.S. 495, 501 (1989).
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result, even defendants with a “clear and indisputable” right to the
enforcement of a forum-selection clause will be stuck in the wrong
forum, forced to litigate the entire case until they can finally take an
appeal.102
The same is true of certain wrongful grants of transfer. If the district
court erroneously enforces an invalid forum-selection clause, for
instance, or fails to recognize the “extraordinary circumstances” that
ought to defeat transfer, then the transferee court will apply its own
choice-of-law principles, which may provide for meaningful review on
appeal after final judgment and prevent mandamus review beforehand.
Even worse, if the different circuits take different positions on issues of
validity—as discussed above103—then a case could theoretically bounce
back and forth between the districts, depending on the varying standards
that each circuit applies.104
These scenarios may seem unlikely or theoretical. But district courts
being fallible, and parties being litigious, it’s reasonable to expect that
orders enforcing or rejecting forum-selection clauses will be routinely
and aggressively appealed. That means that the appellate courts, which
haven’t yet had to deal with these problems, will have to face them
before long.

Conclusion
No Supreme Court decision provides all the answers. It’s too much
to ask of any opinion, much less a short and clear one like Atlantic
Marine, to address every related question or settle every relevant
dispute. But the Court’s decision didn’t just restate existing law. Instead,
it went out on a limb in certain respects: creating new standards for
§ 1404, making validity a key factor in transfer, and changing the rules on
choice of law. Those moves have created their own complications, which
other courts will have to resolve. That process won’t be impossible, but it
will take time—and some hard work from judges, lawyers, and academics
too.

102. Perhaps an appellate court might relax the mandamus standards in such a case. The Fifth
Circuit has previously granted mandamus for the denial of a forum non conveniens motion, which
surely is remediable on appeal, see In re Ford Motor Co., 591 F.3d 406, 415–17 (5th Cir. 2009); but that
case may simply have been a mistake, as it cited and relied on inapposite precedent concerning venue
transfers, see id. at 416.
103. See supra notes 40–41, 48 and accompanying text.
104. Cf. 15 Wright et al., supra note 18, § 3846 (noting that courts often, but not always, respect
the prior court’s transfer decision as law of the case).

